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INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of states offer some sort of legal status to
same-sex couples and their families, whether through recognition of
same-sex marriages, civil unions, domestic partnerships, reciprocal
beneficiary status, or some other sort of familial relationship. How-
ever, some individuals refuse to recognize lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) relationships as a matter of conscience, and var-
ious commentators have urged states to adopt legislation protecting
such refusals.
Conscience exemption legislation is not new—states have already
passed legislation protecting those who refuse to take part in the pro-
vision of abortion or other medical procedures deemed contrary to the
dictates of conscience. Yet, commentators pointing to the healthcare
exemption statutes as a model for relationship exemption legislation
tend to discount some of the problems associated with the existing
statutes and, further, tend to overlook important dissimilarities be-
tween these differing kinds of conscience clauses. While the creation
of an exemption based on sincere belief might seem an ideal compro-
mise whereby same-sex couples and their families can receive legal
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recognition and those with religious qualms will not be forced to vio-
late their convictions, such a compromise loses its luster upon further
consideration. By creating one exemption specifically for same-sex
relationships rather than a more generalized exemption for those
with religious reservations about facilitating or being associated with
relationships contrary to their beliefs, the state would undermine
its commitment to equality by implicitly suggesting that individuals
might rightly object to this kind of union, but no other, on religious
grounds. Such a message reinforces rather than reduces stigma and
second-class citizenship, which is exactly what the state should not
be doing. While all difficulties would not be resolved by creating a gen-
eralized exemption so that individuals would not be forced to recog-
nize any relationships contrary to conscience, the kind of exemption
at issue here is especially problematic. This article discusses recent
attempts to craft a compromise whereby same-sex couples will be
allowed to receive certain civil benefits, but individuals with religious
objections to such relationships will be afforded by law the right to
discriminate against these unions but no others. The article concludes
that while religious beliefs must be taken seriously, this kind of com-
promise undermines both religion and same-sex relationships, and
thus needs to be rethought.
I. EXEMPTIONS FOR THOSE OBJECTING TO PERFORMING WORK
CONTRARY TO FAITH
Various states have passed legislation protecting those who
refuse to participate in certain practices that violate their religions’
dictates. A brief consideration of the case law in this area, however,
reveals some of the difficulties associated with the creation of such
exemptions and illustrates why they do not provide the obvious, virtu-
ally cost-free solution to the problems posed when individuals object
as a matter of conscience to providing certain services.
A. The Limitations of Conscience
Employees have long asserted in a variety of contexts that they
were precluded by conscience from performing certain tasks. For ex-
ample, individuals have refused to participate in war because of their
sincere objections to killing.1 In Welsh, the Court examined the case
of Elliot Welsh II, who refused to report to be drafted because he was
“ ‘conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.’ ” 2 He
1. E.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 333 (1970) (seeking conscientious
objector status from the Armed Forces).
2. Id. at 335 (quoting 62 Stat. 612).
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was not claiming that his objections were based in religion, because
“his beliefs . . . [were] formed ‘by reading in the fields of history and
sociology.’ ” 3 That said, however, he held these convictions with the
same “strength” as might someone whose objection to war was reli-
giously based.4 The Court interpreted the statutory exemption to in-
clude individuals like Welsh whose heart-felt reservations about war
were not directly based on religious beliefs.5
The conscientious objection at issue in Welsh might be contrasted
with a different type of objection to promoting a war effort, where the
objection is to participating in particular wars rather than partici-
pating in war as a general matter.6 In Gillette, one of the plaintiffs
was a devout Catholic who believed it “his duty as a faithful Catholic
to discriminate between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars, and to forswear par-
ticipation in the latter.” 7 Asked to decide whether the conscientious
objector law included those who objected to particular wars on reli-
gious grounds,8 the Court held that the objection to particular wars
rather than to war as a general matter did not qualify under the rele-
vant statute.9 Yet, this meant that those with sincere religious beliefs
that included an objection to all wars would qualify for an exemp-
tion, whereas someone with equally sincere religious beliefs that in-
cluded an objection to only unjust wars would not qualify for such
an exemption.10
3. Id. at 341 (quoting Welsh’s conscientious objector application).
4. See id. at 343 (holding that plaintiff maintained his beliefs with the force of more
mainstream religious principles).
5. See id. at 343-44 (finding that the statute in question only required an individual
have “deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs [that] would give them no rest or
peace . . .”); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
[T]he test of belief “in a relation to a Supreme Being” is whether a given be-
lief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies
for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of
their respective holders we cannot say that one is “in a relation to a Supreme
Being” and the other is not.
Id.
6. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 439 (1971).
7. Id. at 441.
8. See id. at 439 (“These cases present the question whether conscientious objection
to a particular war, rather than objection to war as such, relieves the objector from respon-
sibilities of military training and service.”).
9. See id. at 447.
[W]e hold that Congress intended to exempt persons who oppose participating
in all war—“participation in war in any form”—and that persons who object
solely to participation in a particular war are not within the purview of the
exempting section, even though the latter objection may have such roots in
a claimant’s conscience and personality that it is “religious” in character.
Id.
10. Id. at 440 (noting that an objection to the Vietnam War and not all war disqualified
petitioner from exemption).
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Plaintiffs claimed that the refusal to grant an exemption to those
who wished to differentiate among wars violated Establishment
Clause guarantees.11 In rejecting that assertion, the Court noted that
the touchstone for determining whether the Clause was violated was
“neutrality,”12 emphasizing that the Establishment Clause prohibits
the government from putting its “imprimatur on one religion, or on re-
ligion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious orga-
nization.”13 However, the Court did not believe that Congress was
attempting to favor some religions over others when affording an
exemption to those opposing all war rather than only certain wars,14
but merely attempting to affect a compromise that took account of
conflicting interests.15 On the one hand, Congress recognized the
practical difficulties associated with trying to force a sincere consci-
entious objector to fight,16 and wished to take into account a “concern
for the hard choice that conscription would impose on conscientious
objectors to war, as well as respect for the value of conscientious action
and for the principle of supremacy of conscience.”17 On the other hand,
Congress also had a “need for manpower”18 and, further, an important
interest in employing a “fair system for determining”19 who would
be selected for inclusion in the armed services.20 The Court was
persuaded by the government’s claim that the interest in fairness
would be at risk if objections to particular wars were permitted,
11. Id. at 437.
12. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450.
13. Id. (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962) (citation omitted)).
14. See id. at 451-52.
Properly phrased, petitioners’ contention is that the special statutory status
accorded conscientious objection to all war, but not objection to a particular
war, works a de facto discrimination among religions. This happens, say peti-
tioners, because some religious faiths themselves distinguish between per-
sonal participation in “just” and in “unjust” wars, commending the former
and forbidding the latter, and therefore adherents of some religious faiths—
and individuals whose personal beliefs of a religious nature include the dis-
tinction—cannot object to all wars consistently with what is regarded as the
true imperative of conscience.
Id.
15. Id. at 453 (citing United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes,
C.J., dissenting)).
16. Id. (discussing “the hopelessness of converting a sincere conscientious objector into
an effective fighting man”) (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369 (White, J.,
dissenting)).
17. Id. (citation omitted).
18. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 455.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 455 n.20 (“The Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Selective Service (1967) is aptly entitled In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All
Serve?”).
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because there would be “a real danger of erratic or even discrimina-
tory decisionmaking in administrative practice.” 21
This interpretation of the relevant statute was driven in part by
public policy considerations. The Court foresaw the difficulty that
would otherwise arise when trying to fashion a way to cabin the ex-
emption—a whole host of individuals might claim to have an objection
of conscience to a particular war, and it would be difficult if not im-
possible to determine which claims had merit in a fair or accurate
way.22 The potential for abuse must always be considered whenever
exemptions are proposed or applied.
The Court has made clear that an individual who objects to one
war in particular rather than to war as a general matter will not be
protected by federal constitutional guarantees when refusing to serve
in the military.23 Yet, it should not be thought that the only cases
involving religious objections to war have involved individuals seek-
ing to avoid the draft. On the contrary, there have been other con-
texts in which individuals with religious qualms about aiding a war
effort have argued that they should not be forced to perform certain
jobs.24 In Thomas, the plaintiff claimed that his religion prevented
him from helping make war materials.25 The Court in Thomas noted
that “beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause,” 26 although the Court recognized that determining “what is
a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and
delicate task.” 27 In an effort to provide some guidance about how to
determine whether a belief or practice is religious, the Court pointed
out some criteria that should not be used, noting that “religious be-
liefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” 28
Thomas had been forced to choose between working on the one
hand and maintaining his religious beliefs on the other.29 He chose
the latter, and the question before the Court was whether Indiana
could deny him unemployment benefits—the state claimed that he
had failed to establish that he had left work for good cause.30 The
21. Id. at 455.
22. Id. at 455-56.
23. Id. at 447, 462.
24. E.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981).
25. Id. at 709.
26. Id. at 713.
27. Id. at 714 (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 717 (noting his “choice between fidelity to religious belief or cessation of
work”).
30. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717 (“Indiana requires applicants for unemployment
compensation to show that they left work for ‘good cause in connection with the work.’ ”)
(citation omitted).
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Court held that the state could not deny him benefits based on his
refusal to work for religious reasons.31 Indeed, the Court offered a
rather robust understanding of the free exercise jurisprudence:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise
is nonetheless substantial.32
Here, the Court followed the position offered in Sherbert v.
Verner,33 where the Court struck down South Carolina’s refusal to
accord unemployment benefits to an individual who refused to work
on Saturday because of her religious beliefs.34 The South Carolina
Employment Security Commission had found that “appellant’s re-
striction upon her availability for Saturday work brought her within
the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail,
without good cause, to accept ‘suitable work when offered . . . .’ ” 35
Basically, the South Carolina Employment Commission decided that
for purposes of the statute, a refusal to work on one’s Sabbath did not
qualify as a justification or excuse.36
The Court rejected the South Carolina Commission’s position,
reasoning that Sherbert was forced to “choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand.” 37 The Court emphasized that “such a choice
puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.” 38
After finding that the state requirement imposed a substantial burden
on Sherbert, the Court sought to determine whether “some compel-
ling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South
Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s
31. See id. at 720 (“Thomas cannot be denied the benefits due him on the basis of the
findings of the referee, the Review Board, and the Indiana Court of Appeals that he ter-
minated his employment because of his religious convictions.”).
32. Id. at 717-18.
33. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
34. Id. at 399 (“Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was dis-
charged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the
Sabbath Day of her faith.”).
35. Id. at 401.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 404.
38. Id.
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First Amendment right.” 39 No such interest was present.40 The
Court was careful to note that “the recognition of the appellant’s
right to unemployment benefits under the state statute [does not]
serve to abridge any other person’s religious liberties.” 41 Yet, one of
the ways that exemptions for people refusing to perform same-sex
marriages differs from other kinds of exemptions is that marriage
rights for members of the LGBT community may be of religious as
well as civil import and thus the denial of those rights may implicate
matters of faith.42
When explaining that the Constitution does not require indi-
viduals to forsake the precepts of their religion merely because legit-
imate state interests might thereby be promoted,43 the Court was not
implying that those precepts had to be in accord with the tenets of an
established religion. On the contrary, as was demonstrated in Frazee
v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,44 precepts need not be
found in the formal dogma of an established religious denomination
in order to be given constitutional weight.45
At issue in Frazee was the plaintiff’s sincere religious belief that
he should not work on Sunday.46 However, Frazee was not a member
of an established religious group or sect, and his beliefs about work
on Sunday did not spring from the teachings of a particular religious
group or body.47 The Court explained that the lack of connection be-
tween Frazee (or his beliefs) and an organized religion was not fatal,
rejecting “the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular reli-
gious organization.” 48 Because his religious belief was sincere,49 it
was entitled to protection.50
39. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
40. Id. at 409; see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 139
(1987) (“[T]he Appeals Commission’s disqualification of appellant from receipt of benefits
violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”).
41. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409.
42. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
43. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
44. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
45. Id. at 834.
46. Id. at 830 (“William Frazee refused a temporary retail position offered him by Kelly
Services because the job would have required him to work on Sunday. Frazee told Kelly
that, as a Christian, he could not work on ‘the Lord’s day.’ ”).
47. See id. at 831 (“Frazee was not a member of an established religious sect or church,
nor did he claim that his refusal to work resulted from a ‘tenet, belief or teaching of an
established religious body.’ ”) (citing Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 512 N.E.2d, 789, 791
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987)).
48. Id. at 834.
49. Id. (“Frazee’s refusal was based on a sincerely held religious belief.”).
50. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834.
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It is simply unclear whether the kinds of protections recognized
in Sherbert, Thomas, and Frazee are still recognized today. In the
meantime, the Court has decided Employment Division of the Depart-
ment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,51 in which Oregon’s
statute prohibiting the use of controlled substances was challenged
as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.52 While “a State would be
‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’ if it sought to ban such acts
or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or
only because of the religious belief that they display,” 53 there was no
evidence that Oregon was targeting religious practice.54 The Court
explained that the Free Exercise Clause does not “require exemptions
from a generally applicable criminal law . . . ,” 55 and seemed tempted
to limit the strength of the Clause’s protections in the unemployment
benefit context.56
According to the Court in Smith, the Free Exercise guarantees
afforded by the Constitution are not particularly robust.57 For exam-
ple, “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ” 58 However, the Court
offered a possible loophole whereby the otherwise tepid protections
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause might be stronger, namely,
those situations implicating both Free Exercise and other protected
interests.59 It is not at all clear, however, that this hybrid loophole
51. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
52. Id. at 874 (“This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use
within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug . . . .”).
53. Id. at 877 (alteration in original).
54. Id. at 882 (“There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law represents an
attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising
of one’s children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds
plainly controls.”).
55. Id. at 884.
56. See id. at 883 (“We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis
of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we have
sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have
always found the test satisfied . . . .”) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)).
57. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 966 (Cal.
2008) (“[U]nder the United States Supreme Court’s most recent holdings, a religious
objector has no federal constitutional right to an exemption from a neutral and valid law
of general applicability on the ground that compliance with that law is contrary to the
objector’s religious beliefs.”) (emphasis in original).
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
59. See id. at 881 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
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would be of much help to those seeking an exemption from recogniz-
ing LGBT families, since the hybrid loophole would seem more likely
to be invoked to require the recognition of same-sex marriages than
it would be to justify individual refusals to assist in the celebration
of such marriages.60
As constitutional matters stand currently, Free Exercise protec-
tions are tepid at best.61 While the United States Constitution would
preclude clergy members from being forced to perform a same-sex
ceremony contrary to their faith,62 it would be highly unlikely that
the Court would find similar constitutional protections for a justice of
the peace. The more controversial issue involves the conditions, if any,
under which a civil servant should be afforded a statutory exemption
from performing his civil duty when fulfilling that duty would contra-
vene his religious beliefs.
B. Contexts in which Claimed Exemptions Might Occur
As should be unsurprising, individuals have claimed that they
were precluded by their convictions from performing certain kinds
of work in a variety of settings. For example, Grace Pierce refused to
work on a particular project because she believed that doing so would
violate the Hippocratic oath.63 Basically, she feared that the drug she
was working on posed too great a risk of harm to justify using it in
trials involving human subjects.64 The New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed that an individual has a right to refuse to continue working
on a project when doing so would violate her convictions,65 but it
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections . . . .”).
60. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Marriage, Free Exercise, and the Constitution, 26 LAW
& INEQ. 59, 102-06 (2008) (arguing that in some cases same-sex marriage would be an
example of such a hybrid).
61. See Toni M. Massaro, Religious Freedom and “Accommodationist Neutrality”: A
Non-Neutral Critique, 84 OR. L. REV. 935, 949 (2005) (“One of many problems with a
neutrality approach to religious freedom is that it translates into very weak protection
of Free Exercise Clause rights.”); see also John E. Taylor, Why Student Religious Speech
Is Speech, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 223, 260 (2007) (noting that “the Free Exercise Clause (both
independently and in hybrid contexts) is so weak”).
62. Cf. Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1, 1 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008)
(“No one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even asked, to perform marriages
that are anathema to them.”) (citation omitted).
63. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 507 (N.J. 1980) (“She felt that by
continuing to work on loperamide she would violate her interpretation of the Hippocratic
oath.”).
64. Id. at 507 (“[Dr. Pierce] concluded that the risk that saccharin might be harmful
should preclude testing the formula on children or elderly persons, especially when an
alternative formulation might soon be available.”).
65. Id. at 514 (“[N]othing in this opinion should be construed to restrict the right of an
employee at will to refuse to work on a project that he or she believes is unethical.”).
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denied that an individual could maintain an action for wrongful dis-
charge unless the practice at issue clearly violated public policy.66
Corrine Warthen refused “to dialyze a terminally ill . . . patient
because of her ‘moral, medical and philosophical objections’ to per-
forming the procedure.” 67 When notified that her continued refusal
to perform the dialysis would result in her being fired, she still refused
and was then discharged.68 Rejecting the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge
claim,69 the court concluded that “by refusing to perform the proce-
dure she may have eased her own conscience, but she neither bene-
fited the society-at-large, the patient, nor the patient’s family.” 70
Frances Free claimed to have been wrongfully discharged71 when
she refused to evict a bedridden patient from the hospital where she
worked.72 However, the court concluded that her objections were not
religiously based,73 holding that her refusal to violate professional
ethical standards did not fall within the protections offered for those
who refuse to engage in medical practices that violate the dictates of
religious conscience.74 Perhaps Free simply committed a strategic
error. Rather than suggest that evicting a bedridden patient violated
her religious beliefs about how the weak and vulnerable should be
treated,75 Free instead suggested that doing so violated her profes-
sional obligations.76 Apparently, she might have been more successful
66. See id. (“[A]n employer may discharge an employee who refuses to work unless the
refusal is based on a clear mandate of public policy.”); see also id. at 512 (“We hold that an
employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to
a clear mandate of public policy.”).
67. Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 230 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985).
68. Id. (“[P]laintiff continued to refuse to dialyze the patient, and the head nurse in-
formed her that if she did not agree to perform the treatment, the Hospital would dismiss
her. Plaintiff refused to change her mind, and the Hospital terminated her.”).
69. Id. at 234 (“[W]e conclude as a matter of law that even under the circumstances
of this case the ethical considerations cited by plaintiff do not rise to the level of a public
policy mandate permitting a registered nursing professional to refuse to provide medical
treatment to a terminally ill patient . . . .”).
70. Id.
71. Free v. Holy Cross Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 1188, 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“The plaintiff,
Frances Free, brought this action against the defendant, Holy Cross Hospital, for wrongful
termination of her employment as a nurse.”).
72. Id. at 1190 (“Free alleges in her complaint that the hospital discharged her for
insubordination because, as an act of conscience, she refused to provide a medical service
ordered by the hospital; i.e., she refused to evict a bedridden patient from the hospital.”).
73. Id. (“Nowhere in Free’s complaint is it alleged that a refusal to follow the hospital’s
orders would conflict with her moral convictions arising from what are traditionally char-
acterized as religious beliefs.”).
74. Id. at 1189. “Based upon the language of the Act, the public policy mandated is that
hospital personnel will not be discriminated against for refusing to perform medical ser-
vices as they relate to their religious beliefs. This contemplates morally controversial issues
such as euthanasia, sterilization or abortion.” Id. at 1190.
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76. Free, 505 N.E.2d at 1190 (“Free’s allegations relate to her ethical duty as a
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had she asserted both theories.77 In any event, many of those assert-
ing ethical objections to performing particular tasks have been quite
explicit that their objections were religiously based, and the courts
have offered very different analyses of the conditions under which
conscientious refusals would be protected.
C. Objections to Abortion or Sterilization in Particular
Several cases have involved individuals who were religiously
opposed to assisting others seeking to accomplish certain reproductive
ends. Marjorie Swanson, a Certified Registered Nurse-Anesthetist,
refused to administer anesthesia to a patient who was to undergo a
tubal ligation.78 Basically, Swanson invoked her rights under Montana
law to refuse to participate in such a procedure.79 The Montana statute
did not qualify this exemption by suggesting that an individual would
not be able to assert such a privilege if doing so would impose a hard-
ship on a particular facility, and the Montana Supreme Court refused
to read such a qualification into the statute.80 Thus, it did not matter
that the hospital might have to schedule procedures in light of the
fact that someone would have to be brought in from fifty or ninety
miles away to assist in the relevant procedure,81 because the statutory
right was “unqualified.” 82
registered nurse not to engage in dishonorable, unethical or unprofessional conduct of
a character likely to harm the public as mandated by the Illinois Nursing Act.”).
77. Cf. id. (“We do not believe that the Act contemplates the protection of ethical
concerns as opposed to sincerely held moral convictions arising from religious beliefs.”).
78. Swanson v. St. John’s Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702, 705 (Mont. 1979).
79. See id. at 704 (“All persons shall have the right to refuse to advise concerning,
perform, assist, or participate in sterilization because of religious beliefs or moral con-
victions.”) (quoting REV. CODE MONT. § 69-5223(2) (1947) (current version at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-5-503(2) (1999))).
80. See id. at 710 (“[S]ection 69-5223 admits of no such limitation or qualification, nor
may the statutory rights of Marjorie Swanson be so weighed because to do so would
emasculate her statutory rights.”).
81. See id. at 709.
The District Court bases this conclusion upon its findings that substitute
nurse-anesthetists available to replace Swanson must be procured from
Bonners Ferry, Idaho, a 55 mile distance or Kalispell, Montana, a 90 mile
distance; that such substitutes are employed at other hospitals and available
only when their schedules do not conflict; that continual arrangements for
substitutes are unacceptable to the hospital because of traveling and sched-
uling difficulties; that uncertainty results in the hospital as to when a steril-
ization procedure might be accomplished, that are detrimental to patients;
and that the cost of substitutes is greater, and is an additional burden to the
hospital and to the hospital patients.
Id.
82. See id. at 710 (noting that the “unqualified” status made the district court’s limi-
tations unlawful).
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Several states have enacted legislation affording individuals ex-
emptions based on conscience,83 although many of the exemptions are
not as robust as was provided in the Montana legislation. There are at
least two different respects in which exemption legislation might be
more or less robust: (1) the breadth of activities that would be sub-
ject to the exemption; and (2) the burdens on the employer that would
have to be met to overcome the protection afforded by the exemption.
1. The Breadth of Activities Subject to Exclusion
California has limited the breadth of activities subject to the
exemption.84 For example, when construing a state statute that pro-
hibited “denying admission or discriminating against any applicant
for study because of the applicant’s reluctance to ‘assist or in any
way participate in the performance of abortions or sterilizations,’ ” 85
a California appellate court explained that “the proscription applies
only when the applicant must participate in acts related to the actual
performance of abortions or sterilizations.” 86 While an individual
would be protected if she chose not to perform an abortion, similar
protection would not be afforded for those asserting the exemption
with respect to “[i]ndirect or remote connections with abortions or
sterilizations . . . .” 87
At issue in Erzinger was whether students could be forced to
pay mandatory student fees for student health services where some
of those fees would be used to support abortion or pregnancy-related
counseling.88 The California appellate court made clear that “the fact
plaintiffs may object on religious grounds to some of the services the
University provides is not a basis upon which plaintiffs can claim a
constitutional right not to pay a part of the fees,” 89 since it could not
be shown that by requiring the payment of these fees the University
was unreasonably interfering with the practice of the plaintiffs’
religion.90
83. See, e.g., Meredith Edwards Eckstut, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 9 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 1153, 1171 (citing forty-two state statutes and one federal law that allow
health care professionals to refuse from participating in certain procedures on moral or
religious grounds).
84. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006) (noting that the statu-
tory right to refuse from participating in abortion procedures is subject to qualifications).
85. Erzinger v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2000)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 391.
89. Id. at 393.
90. See id. at 392-93 (“[T]o prevail on their First Amendment claim, the plaintiffs must
allege and prove the University coerced their religious beliefs or unreasonably interfered
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The interpretive tack adopted by the California court might be
contrasted with that adopted by a federal district court in Indiana.
That court had to interpret the Indiana Conscience Statute, which
read:
No physician, and no employee or member of the staff of a
hospital or other facility in which an abortion may be performed,
shall be required to perform any abortion or to assist or participate
in the medical procedures resulting in or intended to result in an
abortion, if such person objects to such procedures on ethical,
moral or religious grounds, nor shall any person as a condition of
training, employment, pay, promotion, or privileges, be required
to agree to perform or participate in the performing of abortions,
nor shall any hospital, person, firm, corporation or association
discriminate against or discipline any person on account of his
or her moral beliefs concerning abortion.91
Elaine Tramm was an aide whose job description included “clean-
ing surgical instruments.”92 She objected on religious grounds to clean-
ing any instruments that would be used in abortion procedures.93
Tramm was told that she would be fired unless she performed her
job duties, including cleaning instruments that might be used in such
procedures.94 She refused and was fired.95
In this case, the hospital made no effort to accommodate Tramm’s
beliefs.96 Indeed, co-workers volunteered to substitute for her when
abortion instruments needed to be cleaned, but the hospital rejected
that arrangement.97 What was at issue was not the sincerity of her
belief,98 but whether the Indiana statute was intended to include
people like Tramm within its protections.99
with their practice of religion.”) (citing School Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963)).
91. Tramm v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., Civil No. H 87-355, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391,
at *1, *28 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1989) (citing IND. CODE § 16-10-3-2).
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id. at *1-2.
94. Id. at *3.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *12 (noting that “PMH made no effort whatsoever to accommodate Tramm’s
religious beliefs”).
97. Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *12 (“Although Tramm’s co-workers tes-
tified in their depositions that they were willing to clean abortion instruments for Tramm,
PMH rejected this alternative.”).
98. Id. at *15-16 (“Here there would be a direct, substantial burden on the practice of
Tramm’s religion if she is forced to clean abortion instruments. Tramm’s testimony in-
dicates that her anti-abortion stance is a principle tenet of her Catholicism and that any
involvement with abortion procedures would be a substantial violation of her religious
and moral beliefs.”).
99. Id. at *29 (noting the hospital’s argument that only doctors and employees who
“assist” or “participate in” abortion procedures are protected by the conscience statute).
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The court in Tramm examined the language of the statute, which
“protects physicians and other hospital employees and staff from being
required to participate directly in abortion procedures that violate
their beliefs . . . [and] protects employees from being forced to par-
ticipate in the performance of an abortion as a condition for employ-
ment, pay, promotion or privileges.”100 The court reasoned that the
statute was designed to protect people who might be forced to perform
abortion procedures, and that the plaintiff’s duties did not fall within
that protected classification.101
The surprising part of the court’s analysis was in how it inter-
preted the third provision: “nor shall any hospital, person, firm, corpo-
ration, or association discriminate or discipline any person on account
of his or her moral beliefs concerning abortion . . . .”102 At the very
least, this section means that regardless of one’s job duties one will
not be terminated because of one’s religious beliefs.103 The question
at hand, however, is in determining how this section should be ap-
plied.104 The court concluded that since the administrators “admitted
to knowing of Tramm’s beliefs and terminating her for refusing to
perform duties that would violate those beliefs, the termination vio-
lated her rights under the Indiana Conscience Clause.”105
Yet, there was no evidence that the hospital would have allowed
Tramm to continue if her refusal to clean instruments had not been
because of her religious beliefs.106 Nor was there any evidence that
she would have been fired because of her religious beliefs had she
been willing to clean the instruments.107 Rather, the hospital was un-
willing to make an exception for her because her refusal was based
on her religious beliefs.108
100. Id. at *31.
101. Id. at *30 (“In this case, the undisputed facts are that an aide’s duties include pre-
paring and cleaning instruments used in surgical procedures and securing specimen con-
tainer lids before they are transported to the laboratory for analysis. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15).
Under the plain meaning of the statute, those duties do not encompass the ‘performance’
of procedures resulting or intended to result in an abortion.”).
102. Id. at *31 (emphasis in original) (quoting IND. CODE § 16-10-3-2).
103. Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *31 (“Under the third provision, all hos-
pital personnel are within the class of persons who may not be terminated because of their
religious beliefs.”).
104. See id. at *29-30 (recognizing that this court had to try and predict how the Indiana
Supreme Court would interpret the conscience statute, because no Indiana court had pre-
viously construed the scope of the Indiana conscience statute).
105. Id. at *32.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *13-14 (“[I]t is clear that PMH refused to make any accommodation for
Tramm and then terminated her because she refused to perform certain tasks which she
felt violated her religious beliefs.”).
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Perhaps the hospital should have acted differently as a matter
of respect. Others volunteered to substitute for Tramm when she
could not clean the instruments as a matter of conscience,109 and it
should not have mattered to the hospital who sterilized the instru-
ments as long as the sterilization was performed. In the hospital’s
defense, however, the co-workers’ willingness to perform this substi-
tution might not have continued indefinitely.110 The hospital might
have reasoned that it should address the issue early, because the
issue would have to be addressed eventually anyway. Perhaps the
hospital should have adopted a wait-and-see attitude or explored
whether it could have done something else to avoid the problem, e.g.,
transfer her to another job,111 although those measures would not
themselves have been without cost. In any event, the difficulty pointed
to here is not that a blameless hospital was punished, but that the
Indiana court offered an interpretation of the law that simply was
not plausible.
As interpreted by the Indiana court, the third provision swallows
up the other two. If no employee can receive punishment for refus-
ing to perform any job because of her religious beliefs concerning
abortion, then it is of course true that no medical professional can re-
ceive punishment for refusing to participate directly in the provision
of an abortion.112 So, too, a refusal to hire or promote someone be-
cause of her beliefs about abortion would presumably be viewed as
discriminatory, making the second provision superfluous. At least one
of the difficulties suggested by the Tramm decision is that conscience
exceptions might be construed in utterly implausible ways that are
much more robust than anyone intended.113
Suppose that Tramm was hired to help raise money for the hos-
pital. At least one question raised by the decision is whether she would
be immunized from trying to steer unrestricted monies away from the
hospital for fear that they might be used in a way that might improve
facilities where abortions or abortion counseling were offered.114 Or,
suppose that Tramm was hired by the hospital to provide information
to the public, for example, where particular offices or clinics within
109. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
110. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (stating that while individuals initially
willing to cover a nurse so she might avoid doing something that she found religiously
objectionable could eventually refuse to do so).
111. See Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *2 (noting that Tramm asked that
she be transferred to another job).
112. See id. at *31 (noting that, based on the third provision, no hospital personnel can
be terminated due to their religious beliefs).
113. See id. at *17 (stating that when there is substantial pressure to modify beliefs,
a burden on religion exists, violating free exercise).
114. See id. at *12, *18 (noting that an employer need offer only reasonable accommo-
dation to one’s belief).
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the hospital might be found. One wonders if she would be permitted
to refuse to direct families or patients to particular parts of the hos-
pital because she feared that she might otherwise be helping them
to attain abortions or to comfort those who had obtained them.
A related issue arose in a California case, Brownfield v. Daniel
Freeman Marina Hospital,115 which involved a hospital’s refusal to
provide “ ‘pregnancy prevention treatment’ ”116 information to a rape
victim after such information was requested.117 The hospital also
failed to inform the individual that a particular treatment was time-
sensitive and would be most effective within seventy-two hours.118
Brownfield was not informed about the importance of acting quickly
and did not see her family doctor until more than three days passed.119
There was no contention that the rape resulted in pregnancy,120 and
the hospital had advised her to see her doctor within two days with-
out specifying why.121
One of the contested issues was whether use of a morning-after
pill should be thought of as “ ‘post-coital contraception’ ” or, instead,
as abortion.122 The rape victim asserted the former and the hospital
the latter view.123 The California court concluded that for purposes
of the statute offering protection for those refusing to perform abor-
tions, the former rather than the latter view was correct.124 The abor-
tion protection statute was thus interpreted to confer no immunity on
the hospital, so that its refusal to provide the relevant information
might make it liable under appropriate circumstances.125
115. 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
116. Id. at 242.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Brownfield, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
122. Id. at 244.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 245.
Appellant alleged, and respondent by its demurrer admitted, that the
morning-after pill was a “pregnancy prevention” treatment, the proper name
of which was estrogen pregnancy prophylaxis. The conclusion that the treat-
ment constitutes “prevention,” i.e., birth control, rather than “termination,”
i.e., abortion, is consistent with the above-cited law. We therefore conclude
that Health and Safety Code section 25955, subdivision (c), does not immu-
nize respondent from liability for failure or refusal to provide information
about estrogen pregnancy prophylaxis to rape victims.
Id.
125. Id. at 245.
[W]hen a rape victim can allege: that a skilled practitioner of good standing
would have provided her with information concerning and access to estrogen
pregnancy prophylaxis under similar circumstances; that if such information
had been provided to her she would have elected such treatment; and that
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The Tramm court would likely have offered a much different
interpretation of the statute, which stated:
[N]o nonprofit hospital or clinic which is organized or operated
by a religious corporation or other religious organization or its
administrative officers, employees, agents, or members of its
governing board shall be liable, individually or collectively, for
failure or refusal to perform or to permit the performance of an
abortion in such facility or clinic or to provide abortion services.126
The court might well have suggested that supplying any of the
relevant information would be to assist in the provision of abortion
services broadly construed, and neither the hospital nor any of its
employees could be liable for the failure to afford the rape victim the
information that she would need to maximize her chances of avert-
ing pregnancy after being raped.
Consider a related scenario. A patient has a prescription for a
morning-after pill,127 but the pharmacist refuses to fill the prescrip-
tion. In some states, the pharmacist not only would be immune from
liability for refusing to dispense the particular drug, but also for re-
fusing to refer the patient elsewhere.128 Further, there might be no
exception for those who had been raped.129 Thus, while some states
may tailor their exemptions narrowly, other states may offer very
broad exemptions,130 notwithstanding the kinds of harms that might
thereby be caused to those who are refused service or even a referral.
2. Exceptions for Significant Burdens on Businesses
Some statutes with conscience exemptions include a limitation
so that a business will not be forced to incur significant burdens by
damages have proximately resulted from the failure to provide her with in-
formation concerning this treatment option, said rape victim can state a cause
of action for damages for medical malpractice.
Id.
126. Id. at 244.
127. Scott Burris et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic: Legal Issues in the Provision
of Naloxone to Prevent Opioid Overdose, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 273, 326 n.242 (2009) (“Because
the ‘morning after pill’ (also called Plan B or RU-486) is now an OTC medication for women
over eighteen, a prescription is now required only for minors.”).
128. See Catherine Grealis, Note, Religion in the Pharmacy: A Balanced Approach to
Pharmacists’ Right to Refuse to Provide Plan B, 97 GEO. L.J. 1715, 1723 (2009) (noting that
the conscience clauses of Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Dakota do not impose
a duty on pharmacists to give advanced notice of their refusal or a referral).
129. See id. (“[N]one provide an exception for women who are raped.”).
130. See id. (noting that four states have adopted laws protecting pharmacists while
other states have enacted laws to protect patient access to both emergency contraception
and prescription medication).
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employing someone who refuses for religious reasons to perform
particular procedures, Florida is an example. Consider the Florida
conscience statute:
Nothing in this section shall require any hospital or any person
to participate in the termination of a pregnancy, nor shall any hos-
pital or any person be liable for such refusal. No person who is
a member of, or associated with, the staff of a hospital nor any
employee of a hospital or physician in which or by whom the termi-
nation of a pregnancy has been authorized or performed, who shall
state an objection to such procedure on moral or religious grounds,
shall be required to participate in the procedure which will result
in the termination of pregnancy. The refusal of any such person
or employee to participate shall not form the basis for any disci-
plinary or other recriminatory action against such person.131
While the statute does not expressly include any consideration
of the possible burdens that might be placed on a business by virtue
of a conscience exemption, a Florida appellate court interpreted the
statute to incorporate such a limitation, “an employer must reason-
ably accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless he estab-
lishes that he would suffer undue hardship.”132
Margaret Kenny alleged that she was demoted because of her
refusal to assist in abortions and other reproduction-related mat-
ters.133 Her employer attempted to accommodate her refusal by ask-
ing other nurses to exchange duties with her.134 However, after a
while, the other nurses refused to substitute for her,135 and Kenny’s
employer did not take the further step of arranging Kenny’s schedule
so she would never be assigned to assist in providing abortions.136 The
court in Kenny reasoned that “[a]lthough appellees would incur some
hardship, the record does not support a finding that undue hardship
would result.”137
131. Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, Fla., Inc., 400 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing FLA. STAT. § 458.22(5) (1977)).
132. Id. at 1266.
133. Id. at 1267 (Hendry, J., dissenting) (“[T]his action filed by the Plaintiff is founded
on employment discrimination from her employment as a nurse and her duties in termi-
nation of pregnancy procedures and other related birth control and sterilization operations
contrary to her religious beliefs.”).
134. Id. at 1263, 1266.
135. Id. at 1266 (“Some efforts toward accommodation were made by fellow employees
seeking to assist appellant. When other nurses ceased cooperating, however, the employer
made no further effort to accommodate appellant.”).
136. Id. at 1266-67 (“There is no showing that schedules could not have been arranged
to accommodate appellant’s religious beliefs.”).
137. Kenny, 400 So. 2d at 1267 (emphasis in original).
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Yet, there is reason to think the appellate court underestimated
the burden that was thereby imposed. The trial court found that to
accommodate the plaintiff’s desires, the employer would have to hire
someone else138 at a time when doing so would not be fiscally pru-
dent.139 The appellate court neither explained why being forced to hire
another person to accommodate Kenny was not an undue burden as
a matter of law,140 nor what would have constituted an undue burden.
If forcing an employer to hire additional workers does not qualify,
then burdens might be quite significant without crossing the rele-
vant threshold.
The Seventh Circuit has explored the contours of the existing
undue burden jurisprudence in a series of cases. In one, an FBI em-
ployee refused to investigate pacifist groups accused of destroying gov-
ernment property.141 John Ryan was a Catholic who believed that the
United States Bishops’ Pastoral Letter on War and Peace “show[ed]
the impropriety of conducting investigations into groups that destroy
governmental property to express their opposition to violence.”142 He
informed his superior that this letter might make it impossible for him
to perform particular duties.143 However, he did not ask to be reas-
signed or to have different duties as a general matter,144 and rejected
a fellow employee’s offer to take over the particular investigation that
Ryan could not perform in good conscience.145 While Ryan had been
willing in the past to trade assignments so he would not have to in-
vestigate the alleged criminal acts of non-violent groups,146 he was
unwilling to make a similar compromise this time.147
Ryan’s sincerity was not in question.148 The Seventh Circuit
raised but did not decide whether it would be an undue burden to
require the FBI to offer transfers to those agents who had religious
138. See id. at 1268 (Hendry, J., dissenting) (noting that the district court found that
“the lack of employee cooperation would have resulted in the employer paying additional
wage salaries contrary to sound business and fiscal management”).
139. See id. at 1267 (noting the district court’s finding that “there is justifiable and
compelling financial basis for Defendant’s decision” and that the decision was “made in
good faith based on fiscal necessity”).
140. Id. (“We therefore hold that appellees failed to sustain their burden of establish-
ing undue hardship, and we reverse the trial court’s decision.”).
141. Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 459 (7th Cir. 1991).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 459 (“Agent James Swinford volunteered to swap assignments with Ryan.
He declined. An agent had taken off Ryan’s hands an earlier order to investigate a group
of peace activists including nuns and priests; this time Ryan chose confrontation.”).
146. Id.
147. Ryan, 950 F.2d at 459.
148. See id. at 460 (“Ryan’s sincerity is unquestioned.”).
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objections to the performance of particular tasks.149 Because Ryan
had refused the reasonable accommodation of swapping assignments,
the difficult determination of what would constitute an undue burden
could be left for another day.150
The Seventh Circuit had another opportunity to discuss undue
burdens in Wright v. Runyon.151 Gordon Wright, a Seventh Day Adven-
tist, had a position with the United States Postal Service that did not
require him to work on his Sabbath,152 but that position was abol-
ished.153 He could have gotten a different position that did not require
his working between sundown on Friday and sundown on Saturday,
but he did not seek it.154 He became an “unassigned regular,” which
meant that he could be assigned to any open position, and was eventu-
ally assigned to a position requiring him to work on Friday evening.155
The court in Wright suggested that he was responsible for his own
Hobson’s choice between quitting his job or working on the Sabbath,
because he did not avail himself of the opportunity to take a compa-
rable position that did not require him to work on the Sabbath.156 Be-
cause the position that he could have had would not have involved
149. Id. at 461.
Whether tolerating Ryan’s disobedience and that of other agents with sincere
religious claims would contribute to a breakdown in discipline, and whether
transferring such an agent to an assignment where nonviolent protests are
not a potential issue would hinder the efficient operation of the FBI, are
subjects about which reasonable persons can and do differ.
Id.
150. See id.
Reallocation of work between agents is the most obvious accommodation, one
that Ryan’s fellow agents had arranged for him before. Because Ryan refused
Swinford’s offer to arrange for a swap this time, we need not decide whether
a series of swaps—potentially calling for training a different agent in the tech-
niques of domestic security investigations—would create “undue hardship”
for the FBI.
Id.
151. 2 F.3d 214 (7th Cir. 1993).
152. Id. at 215.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 216 (“[F]our positions were let for bid in the ordinary process that did not
require work during Wright’s Sabbath. Wright would have received at least two of these
positions, as the senior bidder, had he bid for them.”).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 217.
The bidding system enabled Wright to obtain a job the requirements of which
did not interfere with his religious practices. Indeed, it allowed Wright to
select such a position. This strikes us as a paradigm of “reasonable accom-
modation.” Wright, in refusing to bid on two “flat sorter machine operator”
jobs that would not have required work during his Sabbath, chose not to take
full advantage of the bidding system. Wright, not the Postmaster General,
is therefore responsible for the consequences.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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a reduction in pay or transferring from a skilled to an unskilled
position, the Postal Service was held to have offered him a reason-
able alternative.157
Individuals might request their employers to modify work sched-
ules or assignments for a variety of reasons. Angelo Rodriguez worked
for the Chicago Police Department and claimed that he was discrim-
inated against because of his religious beliefs158 when he was assigned
to protect an abortion clinic.159 Rodriguez could have avoided this prob-
lem without losing pay or benefits by being transferred to a district
that did not contain an abortion clinic,160 but he liked being in the dis-
trict where he was currently assigned.161 The Seventh Circuit sug-
gested that the Police Department had met its burden by affording
the opportunity to work elsewhere for similar pay and benefits.162
Judge Posner made clear in his concurrence that he would have
gone further—he suggested that “police officers and firefighters have
no right under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to recuse them-
selves from having to protect persons of whose activities they disap-
prove for religious (or any other) reasons.”163 He worried about the
effect on the public confidence were such a right of recusal recog-
nized,164 explaining:
157. Wright, 2 F.3d at 217 (“The USPS here has taken adequate steps to accommodate
Wright’s religious practices.”).
158. Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1998). “As a life-long
Roman Catholic, Officer Rodriguez accepts the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church
that an elective abortion is the wrongful taking of innocent human life and that individuals
have a general moral obligation to avoid participating in, or facilitating, an elective abor-
tion.” Id. at 773.
159. Id. at 772.
On September 20, 1995, Angelo Rodriguez, a patrol officer in the Chicago
Police Department (“CPD”), filed a four-count complaint against the City of
Chicago. In that complaint, Officer Rodriguez alleged that the City discrimi-
nated against him on the basis of his religion by refusing to exempt him from
an assignment to stand guard outside an abortion clinic on November 19,
1994.
Id.
160. Id. at 774 (“Officer Rodriguez could have requested transfer to six alternative dis-
tricts on the north side comparable to the 14th District that did not have facilities where
abortions were performed. Due to his seniority, Rodriguez would have been able to make
the change with no reduction in his level of pay or benefits.”).
161. Id. at 776 (“[T]he fact that Officer Rodriguez may prefer an accommodation that
allows him to remain in the 14th District does not render a transfer ‘unreasonable.’ ”).
162. Id. at 775 (“The district court concluded that the City had satisfied its duty to
accommodate Officer Rodriguez by providing him the opportunity . . . to transfer to a dis-
trict that did not have an abortion clinic with no reduction in his level of pay or benefits.
We agree.”).
163. Id. at 779 (Posner, C.J., concurring).
164. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 779 (“The public knows that its protectors have a private
agenda; everyone does. But it would like to think that they leave that agenda at home when
they are on duty . . . .”).
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When the business of the employer is to protect the public safety,
the maintenance of public confidence in the neutrality of the
protectors is central to effective performance, and the erosion of
that confidence by recognition of a right of recusal by public-
safety officers would so undermine the agency’s effective perfor-
mance as to constitute an undue hardship within the meaning of
the statute.165
Judge Posner’s point is well-taken. If individuals must be ex-
empted from performing public safety functions whenever those indi-
viduals have religious objections to anything associated with their
assignment, logistics might become quite burdensome.166 The Eleventh
Circuit worried that forcing a police department to modify training
schedules to accommodate religious beliefs167 would itself impose too
great a burden on the department.168
Judge Posner’s concerns about the loss of public confidence and
the potential health and safety risks that might be created by re-
cusals169 should not be thought limited to contexts in which members
of police and fire departments might be called to duty. Consider a hos-
pital where a nurse refuses to participate in an emergency procedure
that would result in a pregnancy termination.170 The procedure might
165. Id. at 779-80.
166. Cf. Jones v. City of Gary, 57 F.3d 1435, 1442 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If the fire chief is
unable to find a last minute replacement, the post may go unstaffed and public safety may
be at risk.”).
167. Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 634 (11th Cir. 1995) (“At all times relevant
to this lawsuit, Beadle was a practicing member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
One of the tenets of this faith is the prohibition of secular labor on its Sabbath—from
sundown Friday until sundown Saturday.”).
168. Id. at 637
The Department chose to implement a rotating shift schedule, randomly
assign recruits to shifts, and expose its recruits to a variety of training
officers. In order to accommodate Beadle’s religious practices, the Department
would have been forced to assign him to another training squad and to not re-
assign him during the third phase of training.”). “[T]he magistrate court did
not err when it found that requiring the Department to grant shift exceptions
would result in a greater than de minimis cost and that the City had met its
obligation under Title VII.
Id. at 638.
169. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 779 (“The objection to recusal in all of these cases is not the
inconvenience to the police department, the armed forces, or the fire department . . . . The
objection is to the loss of public confidence in governmental protective services if the
public knows that its protectors are at liberty to pick and choose whom to protect.”).
170. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2000).
In 1994, Shelton refused to treat a patient. According to the Hospital, the
patient was pregnant and suffering from a ruptured membrane (which the
Hospital describes as a life-threatening condition). Shelton learned the Hos-
pital planned to induce labor by giving the patient oxytocin. Shelton refused
to assist or participate.
Id.
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have to be delayed until another nurse could be located, which might
increase risks for the patient.171
Several issues must not be conflated. One issue involves what
conditions satisfy the requirement that a reasonable accommodation
be made. For example, offering an employee a different position where
the conflict would not arise would be a reasonable accommodation as
long as the salary and benefits were similar and the position involved
a similar skill set.172
A different issue involves the conditions under which an em-
ployer must offer such an alternative. That would depend upon the
language of the relevant statute,173 and whether it would be consid-
ered an undue burden for an employer to have to hire an additional
person so that the objected-to procedures could still be performed.174
As to whether an employer would be required to modify schedules to
accommodate beliefs, this might depend upon how easily such a modi-
fication could be made and at what costs to morale or the program as
a whole.175
An entirely different issue is whether an exemption should be
created. This might depend upon a number of factors including how
widespread the exemption would be, and what kinds of obvious and
non-obvious costs would be incurred by affording this exemption.
Some commentators advocate that an exemption be created so that
individuals objecting to LGBT relationships would not have to serve
171. See id. at 223.
In November 1995, Shelton refused to treat another emergency patient. This
patient—who was “standing in a pool of blood”—was diagnosed with placenta
previa. The attending Labor and Delivery section physician determined the
situation was life-threatening and ordered an emergency cesarean-section
delivery. When Shelton arrived for her shift, she was told to “scrub in” on the
procedure. Because the procedure would terminate the pregnancy, Shelton
refused to assist or participate. Eventually, another nurse took her place. The
Hospital claims Shelton’s refusal to assist delayed the emergency procedure
for thirty minutes.
Id.; additionally, “[t]he Hospital believed Shelton’s refusals to assist risked patients’
safety.” Id.
172. Id. at 226 (“Shelton has not established she would face a religious conflict in the
Newborn ICU. The Hospital’s offer of a lateral transfer to that unit thus constituted a
reasonable accommodation.”).
173. See Grealis, supra note 128, at 1725-26 (discussing the Washington and California
statutory exemptions for pharmacists).
174. Cf. Shelton, 223 F.3d at 224 (“Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires em-
ployers to make reasonable accommodations for their employees’ religious beliefs and
practices, unless doing so would result in ‘undue hardship’ to the employer.”).
175. See, e.g., Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 636 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The Supreme
Court has described ‘undue hardship’ as any act requiring an employer to bear more than
a ‘de minimis cost’ in accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs. . . . The Court has
also recognized that the phrase ‘de minimis cost’ entails not only monetary concerns, but
also the employer’s burden in conducting its business.”).
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or associate with members of the LGBT community.176 However, it
seems clear that many of those proponents have not given adequate
consideration to all the costs that would have to be borne by recog-
nizing such an exemption.177
II. CONSCIENCE EXEMPTIONS AND THE LGBT COMMUNITY
When trying to figure out whether to create an exemption so that
those objecting to LGBT families would not have to support such
families, a number of factors might be taken into account.178 For ex-
ample, the importance of the implicated interests and the rationale
for making the particular exemption at issue.179 A less obvious con-
sideration might involve the implications, if any, of providing an ex-
emption with respect to this group but no others. Contrary to what
commentators might believe, creation of an exemption for conscience
with respect to the treatment of members of the LGBT community
will not be virtually cost-free.180 On the contrary, creating such an ex-
emption so that individuals in the workplace would be free to refuse
to perform their normal duties for those in “religiously objectionable”
relationships would create a whole host of difficulties that would
inure to the detriment not only of those immediately affected but to
society as a whole.181
176. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex
Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS, 77, 101-02 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello & Robin
Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008) (noting some religious objectors to same-sex marriage will
not favor the author’s proposal that while there should be an exemption to facilitating such
relationships, such a refusal is would be unavailable where significant burdens to the
same-sex couple would occur).
177. Id. at 94 (“Legislatures that enact conscience clauses are, by definition, valuing
more heavily the moral and religious convictions of the objectors; and legislatures that re-
fuse to enact conscience clauses are valuing more heavily the dignitary interests of same-
sex couples—not to be embarrassed, not to be inconvenienced, not to have their choice
questioned.”).
178. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-
Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 494-95 (2008) (discussing some factors to be taken
into account when deciding whether to create an exemption in the context of adoption).
179. See id. (asking “What impact would a legislative exemption have on same-sex
couples seeking to adopt?” or “What percentage of adoption agencies are likely to object
to serving them?” or “Will other adoption agencies fill their needs?”).
180. Cf. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life after
Prop 8, 14 NEXUS 101, 109 (2009) (“In rare instances, it is possible that permitting a reli-
giously based refusal may create a hardship for the person seeking an abortion—or in this
context, for the couple seeking a marriage license”).
181. See id. at 100-01 (“[I]t is much easier to imagine hardships resulting from the
denial of benefits that other married couples enjoy, such as hospital visitation. Even where
hardships do not result, being turned away can inflict damage which should not be lightly
dismissed—the harm to one’s dignity.”); see also id. at 101 (“Indeed, marriage is the touch-
stone for receiving a host of government-provided or government-mandated benefits that
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A. Creating an Exemption for Those with Religious Objections to
Same-Sex Marriage
Some commentators suggest that states should enact statutes
affording exemptions so that those with religious objections to LGBT
relationships would not have to promote those relationships, just as
states already afford exemptions to those who have religious objections
to performing abortions.182 While these commentators are correct that
the experience with abortion exemptions should be examined, they
are incorrect that our experience with such legislation suggests that
we have an easy compromise within reach.183
Suppose that a state enacted a statute to protect those who did
not want to officiate at a same-sex marriage. First, it should be noted,
such a provision would not be necessary to protect clergy refusing
to celebrate marriages contrary to their faith, because they could not
be forced to celebrate such marriages even without such a statutory
exemption.184 However, such a provision might be necessary for pub-
lic officials, for example, town clerks or justices of the peace, seeking
to avoid helping same-sex couples who wished to marry.185 Under
such a statute, two individuals of the same sex presenting themselves
before a justice of the peace might be told that although the state
permitted same-sex marriages, the couple would have to find some-
one who did not have religious objections to the union to perform the
ceremony.
married couples simply take for granted: receipt of family medical leave from certain large
employers; benefits for spouses of civil service employees . . . .”).
182. See, e.g., id. at 80 (“This chapter argues further that legislatures should deflect this
litigation with legislative accommodations as they ultimately did with fractious healthcare
services. Indeed, legislative accommodations in medicine offer a number of approaches for
resolving the clash between those who want a service and those who have moral objections
to performing it.”).
183. Id. at 101 (“Perhaps the best we can hope for is to create statutorily a live-and-let-
live solution, one that provides the ability to refuse based on religious or moral objections,
but limits that refusal to instances where a significant hardship to the requesting parties
will not occur.”).
184. See id. at 97 (“As to churches and members of the clergy, the state cannot easily
affect the choices to perform, or to refrain from performing, same-sex unions because of
constitutional doctrines limiting their control of religious functions . . . .”).
185. Cf. Wilson, supra note 180, at 103.
Closer to home, the chief legal counsel for Massachusetts’ governor, on the
heels of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, told the state’s justices
of the peace that they must “follow the law, whether you agree with it or not.”
Anyone who turned away same-sex couples could be held personally liable
under the state’s antidiscrimination statute, which provides for penalties up
to $50,000.
Id. (citing Katie Zezima, Obey Same-Sex Marriage Law, Officials Told, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2004, at A15).
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It might seem that affording such an exemption would not im-
pose any burden on the LGBT community. There are many individuals
who can perform same-sex unions, so permitting particular individuals
to refuse as a matter of conscience to help such couples need not
create an insurmountable stumbling block for those couples wishing
to marry.186 Further, the state might require that a conscientious ob-
jector refer a couple to someone willing to perform the ceremony or,
perhaps, might require that a sign be posted outside an office directing
the couple to the appropriate place.187 Professor Wilson comments:
Clerks’ offices likewise can take steps to avert collisions over
same-sex marriage with good information and good practices.
These offices should ask existing and prospective employees
whether they would anticipate a moral or religious objection and
keep appropriate lists. Same-sex couples who present could then
be directed to a willing clerk with little inconvenience.188
Yet, numerous difficulties are suggested by the practice mod-
eled by Professor Wilson. Imagine the signs that might be posted—
“Different-sex couples here” and “All couples here” or, perhaps, “All
couples, including same-sex couples, here.” In such a scenario, the
same office might be able to handle all couples who met the local mar-
riage requirements, although there is something disquieting about
the image of several couples standing in one line while no one stands
in the other.
Exemption proponents might suggest that such an image should
not be disquieting. After all, when one goes to the airport to get tick-
ets, there might be two lines, one for preferred customers and the
other for non-preferred customers. While the state offering a fre-
quent flyer analogue with regard to marriage would have its own
problems,189 there are separate problems with the state saying that
it prefers certain legal marriages over others. Suppose, for example,
that a couple were to come to a town clerk’s office and see two signs:
186. See Wilson, supra note 176, at 98 (“It does not necessarily follow that permitting
conscientious refusals will bar access to marriage. This is so because so many different
parties in any given state can marry a couple.”).
187. See id. (“Information-forcing rules—that is, rules that require refusing parties to
direct couples to others who will perform the service—allow protection for matters of
conscience without sacrificing access or humiliating same-sex couples. . . . For example,
Illinois requires pharmacies that do not carry emergency contraceptives to post a sign
directing patients to other pharmacies that do.”).
188. Id.
189. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, The Fall of Marital Family Stability and the Rise of Juvenile
Delinquency, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 83, 94-97 (2007) (arguing that society bears heavy costs
when there is an increasing divorce rate).
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“Single-race couples here,” and “All couples, including mixed-race
couples, here.” The difficulties associated with such signs would not
suddenly disappear were there an accompanying explanation that
one of the clerks had religious objections to facilitating mixed-race
marriages.190
The above scenario assumes that the same-sex couple might have
to wait in a different line, but would ultimately be served by the same
office. Yet, that need not be true—a particular office might be staffed
by individuals only willing to help different-sex couples who wished
to marry. If so, a sign might be posted indicating that same-sex cou-
ples would have to go to a different office, city, or county to marry.
Professor Wilson believes that there would be relatively few cases
where same-sex couples would have to go too far out of their way.191
She offers an example to communicate her sense of what would be
too great a burden to impose on same-sex couples wishing to marry:
Imagine, for example, that a same-sex couple resides in the state
of Montana, a million miles from anywhere else, and that there
is only one town clerk that can help the couple complete their
application for a marriage license. By refusing to assist the same-
sex couple, that clerk is effectively barring them from the institu-
tion of marriage, to which state law has said they are entitled.
In this instance, because a real and palpable hardship would
occur, I would argue that the religious liberty of the objector
must yield . . . .192
Professor Wilson should be commended for recognizing that there
are conditions under which the religious liberty of the objector must
yield.193 However, her example does not inspire much confidence that
there would be many instances in which same-sex couples’ needs
would be accommodated. One must wonder, for example, how many
hundreds of miles one could be forced to travel before the burden
would be viewed as too great.
Some commentators imply that being forced to go to another
town or county or, perhaps, waiting additional days because one
190. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text (discussing some of the couples
whose marriages might be viewed as religiously objectionable).
191. Wilson, supra note 180, at 110 (“[O]utside this rare case of a hardship, where there
are other clerks who would gladly serve the couple, and no one would otherwise lose by
honoring the religious convictions of the objector, then I believe those convictions should
be honored. . . . In part I am less willing to trample on religious beliefs [in the wedding
planning context] because I believe that hardships are likely to be fewer—there are simply
more vendors in the marketplace.”).
192. Id. at 109-10 (emphasis added).
193. Id. (“In this instance, because a real and palpable hardship would occur, I would
argue that the religious liberty of the objector must yield . . . .”).
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does not wish to make a match approved by the town clerk194 is simply
one of the prices that same-sex couples have to pay to live in a country
that respects religious freedom.195 Yet, there are at least two reasons
to think that this is a misleading characterization of the debate. First,
respect for religious freedom militates in favor of the recognition
of same-sex marriage, because same-sex couples, like different-sex
couples, may marry for religious reasons among others.196 Ironically,
some of the commentators trumpeting the importance of religious
liberty when arguing for a conscience exemption197 argue against
rather than for same-sex marriage,198 notwithstanding the religious
liberty interests implicated in the latter.199 Whether or not the recog-
nition of same-sex marriage is constitutionally required,200 one might
expect that those proclaiming the importance of religious liberty would
be less selective with respect to the times that they would proclaim
its importance.
Those championing religious liberty often do not seem to appre-
ciate that the arguments offered to justify providing an exemption
with respect to assisting individuals in same-sex relationships would
also support providing a more generalized exemption.201 Religious
liberty might also justify a broad exemption allowing individuals not
to be associated with other relationships of which they disapproved,
for example, interracial, interreligious or intergenerational unions.202
194. See Wilson, supra note 176, at 99 (“The possibility of slight delay while locating a
willing clerk can be addressed with a modified timing rule. States could simply have a
different timing rule for same-sex couples than they do for other couples . . . .”).
195. See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?,
48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 845-46 (2007) (“A bit more respect, flexibility, and humility on all sides
in the clash between religious groups and advocates for rights for gays, lesbians, and trans-
gendered people could open possibilities for resolutions that accommodate civil rights
norms and religious principles.”).
196. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Plaintiff Robin
Joy Shahar is a woman who has ‘married’ another woman in a ceremony performed by
a rabbi within the Reconstructionist Movement of Judaism.”).
197. E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting The Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 181 (1993).
198. E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a Woman,
83 N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (2007).
199. Strasser, supra note 60, at 103 (“[T]here is no reason to believe that same-sex
unions do not play an important role in the spiritual lives of individuals seeking to marry
a same-sex partner.”) (citing Jamal Greene, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 114 YALE
L.J. 1989, 1995 (2005)).
200. See id. at 64-65 (discussing whether same-sex marriage implicates free exercise
concerns).
201. See Colleen Theresa Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic Charities
of Boston was Victim to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious Freedom, 15 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 297, 311-12 (discussing how recognition of same-sex marriage will
have other ramifications in the religious liberty context).
202. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text (discussing couples whose marriages
might be viewed as religiously objectionable).
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B. The Expansion of Exemptions
Those who recommend using healthcare exemptions as a model
for other kinds of exemptions tend not to emphasize that legislation
affording exemptions for those who wish to be excused as a matter of
conscience from performing abortions have not been limited to those
seeking exemption from performing that particular procedure.203
Rather, there has been a tendency to expand those exemptions to
sterilization or, perhaps, to any medical procedure.204
That there has been this expansion should not be surprising.
The rationale supporting an exemption for abortion—individuals
should not be forced to violate their religious convictions in order to
keep a job205—might seem equally compelling whether one is dis-
cussing abortion, sterilization, or other medical procedures.206 But
this suggests that exemptions for those not wishing to promote same-
sex marriage might well expand into other areas.
203. See Grealis, supra note 128, at 1719 (discussing the recent expansion class of
healthcare providers who can also refuse to give out birth control or counsel on other
forms of family planning).
204. Id.
State legislatures have been even more willing than the federal government
to expand conscience clause protection beyond abortion services. Today, thir-
teen states permit some healthcare providers to refuse contraceptive services,
and seventeen states allow healthcare providers to refuse sterilization ser-
vices. In addition, given the recent advancements in medical technology men-
tioned above, some states now provide conscience clause protection for medical
procedures and practices such as family and referral services, assisted repro-
duction, fetal experimentation, human cloning, and euthanasia.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Georgia Chudoba, Comment, Conscience in America: The
Slippery Slope of Mixing Morality with Medicine, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 85, 86 (2007).
Conscience clauses in this country are becoming dangerously broad and over-
inclusive. What was once a protection for physicians who objected to per-
forming abortions is now a tool for religious activists to obstruct a patient’s
right to contraceptives, sterilization, and any other medical procedure that
they feel is “morally” wrong.
Id.
205. Cf. Wilson, supra note 178, at 477 (“For individuals the cost of vindicating one’s
conscience frequently comes at the expense of one’s livelihood.”).
206. Cf. Wardle, supra note 197, at 181.
There is no rational justification for protecting rights of conscience in the
context of just one of these morally controversial medical procedures (for
example, abortion) but not others. Such restrictive protection is fundamentally
inconsistent with the basic principles underlying the extension of any such
protection—respect for constraints of individual conscience, care for the con-
science rights of minorities, and commitment to the value (and belief in the
feasibility) of accommodation. Limiting protection for rights of conscience
to just one or two specific procedures that are politically significant (for ex-
ample, those that bother a majority or influential minority of voters) could
manifest cultural or religious oppression.
Id.
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To see how such an expansion might occur, it would be useful
to consider a broad healthcare exemption. Illinois law prohibits
discrimination against any individual “on account of the applicant’s
refusal to receive, obtain, accept, perform, counsel, suggest, recom-
mend, refer, assist or participate in any way in any forms of health
care services contrary to his or her conscience.” 207 Illinois law further
limits the liability of those who refuse to perform particular health
services as a matter of conscience.208
Suppose that the words “forms of health care” were deleted from
the statute. After all, individuals who did not want to promote same-
sex marriages might also object to providing other services that would
promote same-sex relationships or assist members of the LGBT com-
munity in pursuing a religiously objectionable lifestyle.209 For example,
a Washington district court noted that “[i]t is certainly plausible that
some pharmacist in the State of Washington could . . . deny distribu-
tion of needed HIV-medicine because of personal disdain for a homo-
sexual lifestyle.” 210 Or, consider someone who did not want to offer
relationship counseling because she did not approve of same-sex rela-
tionships and thus did not want to play a role in helping such relation-
ships flourish.211 By the same token, someone else might refuse to let
an apartment or sell a home to someone in a same-sex relationship.212
207. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/7 (West 1993).
208. See id. § 4.
No physician or health care personnel shall be civilly or criminally liable to
any person, estate, public or private entity or public official by reason of his
or her refusal to perform, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or par-
ticipate in any way in any particular form of health care service which is
contrary to the conscience of such physician or health care personnel.
Id.
209. See Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2001)
Bruff testified that when she initially applied to be an EAP counselor she
assumed she would have to counsel homosexuals, but she also assumed she
could refer such individuals when they sought counseling on their relation-
ships. Nothing in the record reflects that she raised this issue with her inter-
viewer, or explored how any such conflicts with her religious beliefs could, in
fact, be accommodated. Instead, she apparently assumed she would only have
to perform those aspects of the position she found acceptable.
Id.
210. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1261 (W.D. Wash. 2007), vacated,
586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
211. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (noting that those who object to same-
sex marriages may object to providing any service that relates to the LGBT lifestyle).
212. Cf. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 276 (Alaska 1994)
(per curiam) (“Swanner, d/b/a Whitehall Properties, appealed the superior court’s decision
which affirmed the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission’s (AERC) order that Swanner’s
policy against renting to unmarried couples constituted unlawful discrimination based on
marital status.”).
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It is clear that Professor Wilson does not envision the conscience
exemption as being restricted to town clerks or justices of the peace—
she believes that bakers, photographers, and wedding planners should
be protected insofar as they do not wish to provide services for same-
sex couples.213 She also believes that just as there should be exemp-
tions for those who object to same-sex marriage, there should be an
exemption for those who object to adoption by same-sex couples.214
Yet, it seems underappreciated how easily such an exemption could
cover most areas of one’s social existence. Presumably, individuals
who morally disapproved of LGBT families might refuse to serve such
families in stores, banks, and restaurants. Indeed, it is not clear how
this exemption would be cabined.
Creating such an open-ended exemption permitting individuals
to be excused from providing services to LGBT families in particular
would be a public policy disaster and might implicate constitutional
protections as well. Affording this exemption to those objecting to
LGBT families but no others would seem to have “the peculiar prop-
erty of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group . . .” 215 which might make it seem “inexplicable by any-
thing but animus toward the class it affects . . . .” 216 But Colorado’s
imposition of a broad disability solely on members of the LGBT com-
munity was struck down by the Court in Romer,217 which suggests
that the kind of exemption envisioned here might also be constitu-
tionally suspect.
One of the important respects in which healthcare exemptions
should be differentiated from the kind of exemptions at issue here is
that the former involves a kind of procedure which would not be per-
formed as a general matter,218 whereas the latter involves members
of a particular group who are subject to something which other simi-
larly situated individuals are not.219 The justice of the peace could
213. Cf. Wilson, supra note 180, at 110 (“I have a harder time requiring every baker,
photographer, and wedding advisor to serve every person who presents . . . .”).
214. Wilson, supra note 178, at 492 (“The parallels between the clashes over abortion
and same-sex adoption are so striking that policymakers would be remiss not to draw on
the abortion experience in deciding how to approach same-sex adoption.”).
215. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 635 (“Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legis-
lative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do.”).
218. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ABORTIONS BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 1990-2005 (2010), available at http://www
.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0100.pdf (showing that only 19.4 women out
of every 1,000 had an abortion in 2005).
219. Cf. MARK STRASSER, ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND THE RULE OF
LAW 108 (2002) (“Some commentators deny that the issue is who should be allowed to
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refuse to perform this marriage about which she had a religious ob-
jection but not another marriage about which she might also have
objections. Consider, for example, the Mississippi conscience exemp-
tion, which states, “[a] health care provider has the right not to par-
ticipate, and no health care provider shall be required to participate
in a health care service that violates his or her conscience.” 220 How-
ever, the Mississippi subsection makes quite clear that a health care
provider is not thereby permitted to refuse “to participate in a health
care service regarding a patient because of the patient’s race, color,
national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed or sexual orientation.”221
Mississippi seems to recognize one of the potential difficulties of ex-
emptions, namely, that they can be used to target specific groups.222
C. The Expansion of the Classes against Whom the Exemption
Might Be Employed
States might well have some difficulty in justifying selectively
respecting the religious liberty of their justices of the peace and
town clerks by affording them an exemption with respect to same-
sex relationships, but not other “religiously offensive” relationships.223
Further, were the state to expand the exemption, it seems likely that
public officials would take advantage of that expansion and refuse to
help other religiously objectionable couples who wished to formalize
their relationships.224 It was not so long ago that individuals would
assert religious objections to interracial marriage,225 and it would be
unsurprising were such claims to be asserted again if such protec-
tions were incorporated into law.226 Other types of unions might also
marry, claiming that lesbians and gays, like everyone else, can marry; they simply cannot
marry someone of their sex.”).
220. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5 (1) (West 2009).
221. Id.
222. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s rejection of discrimin-
ation against interracial couples).
223. See Minow, supra note 195, at 828 (discussing the possibility of granting exemp-
tions based on conscience and not spiritual beliefs).
224. Id. (“[E]ach additional exemption curtails the application of the overarching
norm—and civil rights as a result can be too easily and thoroughly undermined.”).
225. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 581 (1983) (discussing
that a school would not allow students to matriculate if they were dating or married to
someone of another race).
226. Cf. Newscast: Louisiana justice of the peace refuses to apologize for not marrying
interracial couple, SUNDAY TODAY, Oct. 18, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 20611994.
[T]he Louisiana justice of the peace who refused to marry an interracial couple
says he will not apologize and says he did nothing wrong. Beth Humphrey
and Terence McKay says the justice of the peace, Keith Bardwell, told them
he does not marry interracial couples because he’s worried about their
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be subject to similar treatment if, for example, they were thought to
be non-procreative.227 Or, individuals might have objections to facili-
tating those who wished to enter into religious intermarriages.228 In
short, were there an open-ended exemption so that individuals could
refuse to perform marriages contrary to conscience, many kinds of
couples might have their hopes of marriage initially thwarted.
That there might be a whole host of marriages subject to this
exemption would not alone establish that such an exemption should
not be created. Nonetheless, it might give one pause for both practical
and theoretical reasons. Presumably, very few if any of the commen-
tators would wish to return to the day in which burdens could be
placed on an individual seeking to marry someone of another race.
Some commentators suggest that it may not be helpful to com-
pare a refusal to perform a same-sex marriage with a refusal to per-
form an interracial marriage. Professor Koppelman notes that, “[n]ot
all antigay views, however, deny the personhood and equal citizenship
of gay people.” 229 Yet, his point is at best unhelpful for two reasons.
First, the exemption from performing same-sex marriage may well
be part of a broader exemption so that individuals would be free to
refuse any service to members of the LGBT community.230 Were that
so, the exemption might well deny personhood and equal citizenship,
especially if this exemption were targeted so that only those in the
LGBT community would be adversely affected.231 Second, it is impor-
tant to consider the right that is being burdened—at issue is the right
to marry. The Court in Zablocki noted that “the decision to marry has
been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to
procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships,” 232
explaining that “it would make little sense to recognize a right of
children’s future. Well, the couple finally did get married. Bardwell says he
has no plans to step down.
Id.
227. Cf. Rutledge, supra note 201, at 301 (2008) (“God’s design for human sexuality . . .
is first and foremost for procreation.”).
228. See Gustav Niebuhr, Marriage Issue Splits Jews, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/31/us/marriage-issue-splits-jews-poll-finds.html
(discussing the varying opinions on Jews and non-Jews being able to marry).
229. See Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections
for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 145 (2006)
(citing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LAW 53-68 (2002)).
230. See Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussing how an employee assumed she only was required to perform services she found
morally acceptable).
231. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the specific effect Amend-
ment 2 would have on the gay community in particular).
232. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
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privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with re-
spect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation
of the family in our society.” 233 But given the centrality of marriage,
permitting that right to be burdened might well speak to dignity and
equality even if other sorts of limitations would not.
States have a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
on a variety of bases, including race,234 religion,235 gender,236 and orien-
tation.237 This interest must be taken into account when deciding
whether the religious liberty of the objecting public official should win
the day. Indeed, if we look to the healthcare exemption caselaw, we see
that exemptions must sometimes give way when historically discrim-
inated-against groups would be disadvantaged by the exemption.238
Some commentators make clear that they believe an exemption
permitting individuals not to support same-sex marriage is appro-
priate, at least in part, because of the (alleged) wrongness of same-sex
marriage.239 But this is exactly the wrong approach—the state should
not be in the position of deciding whether to grant an exemption based
on the theological correctness of the objector’s position. That would
be precisely the kind of judgment that the Establishment Clause
would prevent the state from making.240
233. Id.
234. See Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 868,
886 (Wis. 2009) (discussing the “state’s compelling interest in prohibiting racial dis-
crimination”).
235. See Mill River Club, Inc. v. N.Y. Div. of Human Rights, 873 N.Y.S.2d 167, 173
(App. Div. 2009) (discussing the “compelling state interest in preventing discrimination
on the basis of religion”) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
236. See Lahmann v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 121 P.3d 671, 685
(Or. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing “the state’s compelling interest in eliminating gender dis-
crimination”).
237. Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1,
5 (D.C. 1987) (discussing “the District of Columbia’s compelling interest in the eradication
of sexual orientation discrimination”).
238. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 93-94
(Cal. 2004) (“Nor are any less restrictive (or more narrowly tailored) means readily avail-
able for achieving the state’s interest in eliminating gender discrimination. Any broader
exemption increases the number of women affected by discrimination in the provision of
health care benefits.”); see also N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 189
P.3d 959, 968 (Cal. 2008) (“The Act furthers California’s compelling interest in ensuring
full and equal access to medical treatment irrespective of sexual orientation, and there are
no less restrictive means for the state to achieve that goal.”).
239. See, e.g., Robert John Araujo, Conscience, Totalitarianism, and the Positivist
Mind, 77 MISS. L.J. 571, 618 (2007) (discussing those objecting to same-sex unions “in
good conscience, based not on ‘feeling’ but on sound and reasoned views of rightness and
wrongness”).
240. Kaitlin DeCrescio, Casenote, An Education in Evolution: Silencing Scientific
Inquiry in Selman v. Cobb County School District, 25 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 285,
301-02 (2006) (“Under the Establishment Clause, the government is prohibited from taking
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The difficulty pointed to here will not be solved by expanding
exemptions so that individuals will be immune from civil rights laws
as long as they have religious or non-religious qualms about inter-
acting with the people in question.241 Such an expansion would im-
pose too great of a cost on society as a general matter—anyone who
had any sort of qualms about dealing with anyone else could thereby
be excused and society could become increasingly balkanized.242
Respect and tolerance for the religious and non-religious alike is more
likely to be undermined than promoted if these kinds of exemptions
for religious and non-religious conscience are enacted.243
CONCLUSION
Commentators suggest that legislatures should afford an exemp-
tion to those who for religious reasons do not wish to serve members
of the LGBT community, likening such exemptions to those already
provided in the context of healthcare. Yet, the existing jurisprudence
on healthcare exemptions suggests that such an exemption, once
offered, might be difficult to cabin both with respect to the kinds of
services subject to the exemption and to the groups of “objectionable”
people who need not be served. All too often, commentators fail to
note the important difference between the compared exemptions—
healthcare exemptions permit those with religious qualms about
performing particular services to refrain from providing them, but
‘sides’ regarding questions of religion.”) (citing Selman v. Cobb Cnty Sch. Dist., 390 F.
Supp. 2d 1286, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2005)); cf. Dieter Grimm, Conflicts Between General Laws
and Religious Norms, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2369, 2373 (2009) (“The more multireligious
a society, the more important it is that the state remain neutral in religious matters. A
state that would take sides in religious matters would lose its capability to guarantee
liberty for all religious faiths.”).
241. See James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 235, 241 (2007) (“[A]lthough such laws make reference to ‘conscience,’
most define that term in a virtually boundless fashion to include ‘religious, moral or ethical
principles.’ ”); cf. Minow, supra note 195, at 827-28 (“A third option . . . is to grant exemp-
tions not only to religious groups, but to other groups that make comparable accommo-
dation requests based on conscience rather than spiritual tenets.”) (citation omitted).
242. See Minow, supra note 195, at 828 (discussing how an expansion would further
undercut the laws of civil rights).
243. Dean Minow does not seem to appreciate this possibility. Cf. id. at 845-46 (“A bit
more respect, flexibility, and humility on all sides in the clash between religious groups
and advocates for rights for gays, lesbians, and transgendered people could open possibil-
ities for resolutions that accommodate civil rights norms and religious principles.”).
Certainly, we would not expect commentators to advocate flexibility about, say, racial
discrimination or exclusion. Cf. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights
and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 120 (2006) (“Just as we do not tolerate private racial
beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the commercial arena, even if such be-
liefs are based on religious views, we should similarly not tolerate private beliefs about
sexual orientation and gender identity that adversely affect LGBT people.”).
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they do not permit individuals to discriminate against a particular
class of persons by providing certain services for some groups of
individuals but not others.
Religious views should be taken seriously but the suggestion
that those with sincere qualms should be permitted to refuse to serve
members of the LGBT community must be rethought. Such a policy
if enacted into law will either create or reinforce second-class citizen-
ship for members of the LGBT community or, if generalized, increase
the balkanization and intolerance that is already undergoing a re-
surgence in this country. Creation of the proposed exemption will
lead to less tolerance and respect for everyone, a result that furthers
the interests of neither the religious nor the non-religious. While
sincere religious views should not be dismissed, they also should not
be allowed to bring about such harm to minorities in particular or to
society as a whole.
